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Book Reviews
Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: A Special Report of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada. Ottawa: LRCC, 1991. ISBN 0-662-
58641-7.
Canada's criminal justice system has been shaken out of its stolid
complacency in recent years by demonstrated instances of unfair treatment
of religious, ethnic and racial minorities, and in particular our Aboriginal
peoples.' Faced with a hue and cry directed at the justice system, the
federal Minister of Justice asked the Law Reform Commission of Canada
to study "as a matter of special priority, the Criminal Code and related
statutes and to examine the extent to which those laws ensure that
Aboriginal persons and persons who are members of cultural or religious
minorities have equal access to justice and are treated equitably and with
respect."2 The Law Reform Commission of Canada took the position that
the plight of Aboriginal persons in relation to the criminal justice system
was sufficiently unique that it justified individual treatment. The report
being reviewed is thus haft ofthe Commissions' response to the ministerial
reference. A second report dealing with cultural and religious minorities
is to be released shortly.
Working under considerable constraints of both time and resources,
the Commission has nevertheless produced a report which is both bold
and pragmatic. The report is bold in that it squarely recommends the
desirability of developing Aboriginal justice systems in Canada. It is
pragmatic in that it also recommends a series of changes to the Criminal
Code and to practice and procedures in criminal justice which would
greatly improve prospects for equal access, equitable treatment and
1. In respect of the mistreatment of aboriginal peoples by the criminal justice system, see: Nova
Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Junior Prosecution, (Chair: T. Alexander
Hickman), (Halifax: The Commission, 1989); Alberta, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task
Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian andMetis People ofAlberta
(Chair: R.A. Cawsey), Edmonton, The Task Force, 1991; and Manitoba, Public Inquiry into
the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry
of Manitoba (Chair: A.C. Hamilton and C.M. Sinclair), (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991).
Perhaps the most virulent criticism of the justice system from racial minorities has followed
a number of instances where black youths have been shot by police in both Montreal and
Toronto.
2. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 34, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal
Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice (As requested by the Minister of Justice
under Subsection 12(2) of the Law Reform Commission Act, Ottawa, 1991, p. 2 .) Hereafter
theReport. Note: This review was completed before the regrettable decision of the Government
of Canada to abolish the Law Reform Commission of Canada.
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respect for Aboriginalpersons coming in contact with the criminal justice
system. Each road-bed in this two track system which the Commission
advises us to take deserves comment here. General comment will also be
made on the viability of a voyage on either track.
The commission is not about to abandon its commitment to the
traditions of criminal justice inherited from the common law as evolved
under the Canadian constitution. It states quite correctly that "[t]he
system that many Aboriginal people would replace or drastically alter is
much admired all over the world, because it is generally characterized by
humanity and a respect for human dignity."3 But the Commission
recognizes that"... this has not been the experience of Aboriginal peoples
with the system."4 The Commission respects Aboriginal aspirations in
this area:
"Aboriginal peoples have consistently voiced their desire to establish
systems of justice that incorporate their own values, customs, traditions
and beliefs but that permit the adaptation of these features to the realities
of the modem age. They have well-articulated and amply documented
reasons for preferring their vision to the present criminal justice system-
a system to which, they contend, they have never consented and that can
never command their respect."5
As a result of its commitment to this perspective, the Commission makes
the following recommendation:
"Aboriginal communities identified by the legitimate representatives of
Aboriginal peoples as being willing and capable should have the authority
to establish Aboriginal justice systems. The federal and provincial
governments should enter into negotiations to transfer that authority to
those Aboriginal communities."6
This is a bold proposal, but it is couched in careful language which
recognizes the difficulties involved.
The Commission is cautious in its advocacy of "negotiated solutions"
since it clearly understands the futility ofattempting to impose amonolithic
"Aboriginal justice system" on Aboriginal communities that have very
different traditions, cultures, and resources and which have suffered in
differing degrees from the effects of three and one-half centuries of
"colonization" (a word which the Commission uses liberally).
Nevertheless, the Commission articulates what it sees as the central
values and aspirations which might distinguish Aboriginal criminal
justice systems from the mainstream system:
3. Report, p. 93.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Report, Recommendation 2, p. 16.
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"... [A] formal (sic) Aboriginal justice system would evince appropriate
respect for community Elders and leaders, give heed to the requirements
of Aboriginal spirituality and pay homage to the relation of humankind to
the land and to nature.
The Aboriginal vision of justice gives pre-eminence to the interests of the
collectivity, its overall orientation being holistic and integrative. Thus, it
is community-based, stressing mediation and conciliation while seeking
an acknowledgement of responsibility from those who transgress the
norms of their society. While working toward a reconciliation between the
offender and victim, an Aboriginal justice system would pursue the larger
objective of reintegrating the offender into the community as a whole."7
The Commission admits that an Aboriginal justice system would of
necessity be "pluralistic", ie., would differ from one Aboriginal community
to another, and that one cannot predict in advance what it/they might look
like. However, the Commission is confident, citing the "Canadian Forum
on Canada's Future", that "the Canadian people have reached a better
understanding of the Aboriginal reality" which "... is now supplemented
by a willingness among Canadians to attempt to redress past injustices."8
Whether this view is justified has yet to be revealed!
The Commission, perhaps presumptuously, suggests that participants
in the negotiations for Aboriginal justice systems might wish to explore
the merits of a list of features which includes:
(a) relying on customary law;
(b) traditional dispute resolution procedures with dispositional alternatives
stressing mediation, arbitration and reconciliation;
(c) the involvement of Elders and Elder's Councils;
(d) the use of Peacemakers;
(e) tribal courts having Aboriginal judges and Aboriginal personnel in
other mainstream roles;
(f) autonomous Aboriginal police forces with police commissions and
other accountability mechanisms;
(g) community based and controlled correctional facilities.'
However, the Commission points to models which use many of these
mechanisms with considerable success.
While the Commission attempts to downplay the radical nature of its
proposals by citing examples of Aboriginal communities where analogous
7. Report, p. 6.
8. Report, p. 94.
9. Report, pp. 22-23.
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experimental projects are now underway, it does recognize the potential
difficulties which must be faced in implementation of such systems.
Constitutional objections, concerns over the rights of individuals and
procedural fairness, and concerns overjurisdictional issues are all identified
by the Commission, but are characterized as difficulties which can be
surmounted. Ultimately, the Commission accepts that Aboriginal justice
systems might fall short of the idealized models advanced by their
proponents. However, the Commission also accepts the legitimacy of the
arguments from Aboriginal peoples which it summarizes as: "Give us the
keys. Let us control the system. We can hardly do worse than you have."' 0
The Commission is willing to assist Aboriginal communities whicli
wish to board.the train on the Aboriginal track and construct the rails and
road-bed as they go. But the Commission is apparently quite realistic
about possible delays before the train leaves the station. Hence, the
Commission proposes considerable change in the mainstream criminal
justice system intended to recognize and redress problems encountered
by Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal accuseds. In order to do this
the Commission forthrightly demands that we abandon allegiance to
simplistic notions of formal equality in the criminal justice system. In its
words: "Justice can no longer be blind: Justice must open her eyes to the
inequities in society and see to it that they are not mirrored in the criminal
justice system."' The Commission puts this general proposition in the
form of a recommendation:
"The criminal justice system must provide the same minimum level of
service to all people and must treat Aboriginal persons equitably and with
respect. To achieve these objectives, the cultural distinctiveness of
Aboriginal peoples should be recognized, respected and, where appropriate,
incorporated into the criminal justice system."' 2
The working out of this principle in the mainstream criminal justice
system constitutes the main bulk of the Commission's report. The
Commission makes these detailed proposals for reform to the present
system in the knowledge that many Aboriginal people view the Canadian
criminal justice as a lost cause, but in the pragmatic belief that much can
be done to improve the present system, and must be done for at least two
reasons: Firstly, comprehensive Aboriginal justice systems may not be
just around the comer. Secondly, not all Aboriginal communities will
necessarily choose to establish separatejustice systems, andthemainstream
10. Report, p. 7.
11. Report, p. 12.
12. Report, Recommendation 1, p. 12.
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system will inevitably be required to continue to cope with (hopefully
reduced) numbers of Aboriginal offenders.'3
The Commission proposes a number of general improvements under
the broad heading of "fostering understanding and building bridges."14
These include: increasing the number of Aboriginal persons in all parts
in the criminal justice system; better cross-cultural training for police,
judges, lawyers, probation officers and correctional officials; improved
awareness of language barriers and translation services; permanent
liaison mechanisms linking all levels of the justice system with Aboriginal
communities; and, increased Aboriginal community involvement with
the justice system. The Commission is aware these improvements will
face social and cost barriers on the part of governments called upon to
implement them, and may not always be received enthusiastically by
certain Aboriginal communities which fear co-option by the present
system rather than concentration of efforts on the creation of independent
and locally controlled justice systems.
There are a large number of techtical recommendations oriented to the
reform of criminal procedure which often rely upon previous reports of
the Commission, while proposing specific adaptations for implementation
in Aboriginal communities or in relation to Aboriginal offenders.1 5
Community-based policing or aboriginal police forces are advocated as
general organizational options, while particular rules are proposed to
reduce police "over-charging" and to improve use of appearance notices
as opposed to arresting Aboriginal offenders. 16 Recommendations relating
to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would discourage unnecessary
prosecutions, and increase pre-trial disclosure which problems pose
particular difficulties in many Aboriginal communities. 17
Recommendations also deal with improved access by Aboriginal persons
to defence counsel, and to possible special rules concerning the
interrogation of Aboriginal suspects. 8 A number of recommendations
are also directed toward courts: greater sensitivity to Aboriginal traditions
in courtrooms in Aboriginal communities, greater use of Aboriginal
Justices of the Peace, more recognition of the right of Aboriginal persons
to swear oaths consistent with their own traditions of spirituality, and the
13. Report, pp. 26-27.
14. Chapter 5 of the Report has this title.
15. These are found in an omnibus Chapter 6, entitled "Changing Roles and Reforming the
Process".
16. Report, pp. 44-48.
17. Report, pp. 49-52.
18. Report, pp. 5 2-55 .
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resolution of problems caused by court sittings in isolated Aboriginal
communities. 19 Many of these recommendations relating to police,
prosecutors, defence counsel and judges require no change in statutory
law, but only a more sensitive exercise of discretionary authority.
However, in some instances the Commission is inclined to the use of
legislative solutions in order to ensure compliance with these changes.
The final group of recommendations relates to change to the critical
institutions of bail, sentencing and corrections. Easier police bail,
recognition of the special requirements of traditional Aboriginal pursuits,
removal of criminal liability for failure to adhere to non-monetary
conditions of conditional release, and a more flexible approach to sureties
are all put forward by the Commission as means to reduce the excessive
numbers of Aboriginal persons now unnecessarily detained in pre-trial
custody.20 On the sentencing front, the Commission recommends use of
alternatives to imprisonment wherever possible, expansion of
victim-offender reconciliation programmes, use of day fines and fine
option programmes to reduce imprisonment for default of fine payment.21
In regard to corrections andparole, the Commission advocates recognition
of Aboriginal Elders and spiritual leaders on the same basis as prison
chaplains, creation of more programmes in prisons designed specifically
to respond to the needs of native offenders, measures to ensure Aboriginal
offenders are able to take advantage of parole to the same degree as
non-Aboriginal inmates, and the construction of local correctional facilities
over which Aboriginal communities would have controlling authority.22
In making these recommendations on bail, sentencing and corrections,
the Commission goes directly to the critical pressure points which lead,
in part, to the unnecessarily high proportion of Aboriginal offenders in
Canada's prisons, and it proposes sensible solutions.
As part of its pragmatism, the Commission is worried about the
prospects for implementation of its recommendations. It recognizes that
many of the recommendations which it makes have been repeated by
various conferences, task forces and commissions of inquiry for at least
15 years. 2 As it says, "... a major difficulty in solving Aboriginal justice
problems lies not in finding the solutions, but in instituting them."24 To
counter arguments that its recommendations would be too costly, the
19. Report, pp. 55-60.
20. Report, pp. 61-66.
21. Report, pp. 66-73.
22. Report, pp. 73-84.
23. Report, p. 85.
24. Ibid.
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Commission advises a comprehensive cost feasibility study (h la Nielson
Task Force) which would analyze the present allocation of all government
resources to Aboriginal communities in order to see whethera fundamental
re-deployment of funds and elimination of duplication can be achieved.
Finally, aware of the further research and consultation which would be
required for the implementation of its recommendations, the Commission
suggests the creation of an Aboriginal Justice Institute, the purposes of
which would include the conduct of empirical research, the development
and evaluation of policy options and programmes within the justice
system or as alternatives to it, and providing assistance to and liaison with
Aboriginal communities in these efforts.'
The careful pragmatism of the Law Reform Commission in its
"reformist" recommendations for improvement of the present criminal
justice system are within the main stream of its current work on reform
of criminal law and procedure. For the most part, its recommendations for
improving the lot of Aboriginal offenders in the mainstream criminal
justice system are non-controversial and capable of easy, low-cost
implementation. While the blindfold ofjustice might be removed in order
to allow her to see and act upon "the cultural distinctiveness of Aboriginal
peoples", the recommendations present no fundamental challenge to the
traditional punitive/adjudicative paradigm which underlies our criminal
law. However, the vision of Aboriginal justice systems potentially
contemplated by the Commission would likely operate upon paradigms
which are very different. This bold and possibly far reaching aspect of the
Commission's work, and the contrast with the bulk of its previous efforts,
deserves further comment.
In the cultures derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe,
the primary notions of criminal justice have developed in relation to a
punitive/adjudicative paradigm. Individuals who knowingly transgress
criminal proscriptions are responsible for their actions and deserve to be
punished. The punishment imposed is intended to deter the perpetrator
from committing further crimes, and to deter others who may be tempted
to do so. The reform and rehabilitation of the offender may also be sought.
Imprisonment will not only punish but serve to remove serious criminals
from society, at least for a time. The punishment is imposed in the name
of society as a whole (or atleast in Canada's case in the name of the Crown
which is thought to represent symbolically the interests of society), and
therefore the conduct of the prosecution is ultimately in the hands of
society's representative, the prosecutor, rather than in the hands of a
victim. In fact, the community participation, even that of the victim, will
25. Report, Recommendation 15, p. 89.
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be reduced to playing the role of witness, except in the rare instances
where there is a trial by jury. The process is one of adjudication of factual
allegations in accordance with procedural protections intended to ensure
protection of individual liberty and formal equality through precise
procedural rights. The complexity of the process is such that it only
operates at its best when conducted by professional jurists -prosecutors,
defence counsel and judges.2 6 While the Law Reform Commission of
Canada has, in the past, made major recommendations which would
mitigate the harshness of this punitive/adjudicative paradigm (diversion,
community sanctions, victim impact statements27, etc.), the main thrust of
the Commission's work has been to render an admittedly punitive and
adjudicative system more fair, consistent and tolerable.2 8 Important and
laudable work, but hardly intended to make a bold break with tradition.
The Commission's acceptance of Aboriginal justice systems in
accordance with the values and institutional elements described earlier
constitutes an important new step for the Law Reform Commission of
Canada. The Commission, as stated earlier, attempts at various junctures
to play down the radical nature of its propositions. For example, the
Report states:
"It is important not to over-state these differences. As a practical matter,
not every community will want to establish its own justice system. Other
systems would be roughly parallel to those existing now. Also, even in
traditional Aboriginal models, differences may appear to be greater than
they really are. The type ofbehaviour that our criminal justice system seeks
to suppress is, by and large, also unwelcome in Aboriginal communities.
The over-all goals of our justice system (deterrence and rehabilitation, for
example) and of any system based on traditional Aboriginal models will
be similar."'29
While some over-all goals might be similar, an Aboriginal justice system
which can be described as informal, holistic, integrative, and
26. Some might argue that the "punitive" aspects of this paradigm are over-drawn here, given
the commitment of so many people in our criminal justice system to the principles of reform
and rehabilitation. However, from the offenders perspective any unwanted restriction of liberty
imposed by the criminal justice system can be and usually is seen as punishment. This
fundamental principle underlies much of the thrust of modem sentencing reform which objects
to the unnecessary sentencing disparity that often results from individualization of sanctions
in the name of reform or rehabilitation of the offender. See Bruce P. Archibald, "Sentencing
and Visible Minorities: Equality and Affirmative Action in the Criminal Justice System"
(1989), 12 Dal. L.J. 377, pp. 385-403.
27. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 2, Guidelines Dispositions and
Sentences in the Criminal Process, Ottawa, 1976.
28. For examples of the Commission's work which fall within the description of tidying and
humanizing the present system, see Report 31, Recodifying Criminal Law - A Revised and
EnlargedEdition ofReport30, Ottawa, 1988; andReport 32, Our CriminalProcedure, Ottawa,
1988.
29. Report, p. 19.
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community-based, stressing spirituality, mediation, conciliation and
victim-offender reconciliation will inevitably be very different from the
secular punitive-adjudicative and rights-based model of the mainstream
justice system.
The Canadian constitutional position, unlike some other federations,
has reinforced the idea that the criminal law and criminal procedure are
matters for national standards, formal legal equality, and "sameness" of
treatment for all Canadians. The Commission's "pluralistic" stance
represents a sharp breakwith that constitutional andpolitical perspective. 0
If the Commission is right in its assessment that the Canadian people are
ready to see Canadian governments negotiate such systems with Canada's
Aboriginal peoples, this may represent an extraordinary opportunity for
progress in the development of the Canadian criminal justice system. For
some time now, critics of the Canadian criminal justice system have
advocated the modification of the punitive/adjudicative model of criminal
justice, by the introduction of more integrative options based on greater
community involvement, diversion, mediation, conciliation and
victim-offender reconciliation.31 The traditional punitive/adjudicative
model is seen by such critics as divisive, costly and counter-productive,
in many instances increasing recidivism and the incidence of crime rather
than reducing these phenomena.3 2 By proposing the possibility of
Aboriginal justice systems, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has
not only presented an alternative for Aboriginal peoples; it has also
proposed a mechanism which can be viewed as a significant social
experiment of potentially vast importance to criminal justice in Canada
as a whole. The bold proposals for Aboriginal criminal justice
recommended by the Law Reform Commission of Canada should be
followed not only in the interests of Aboriginal peoples, but also if,
carefully monitored, for the advantage they may present for all Canadians.
Bruce P. Archibald
Professor of Law
Dalhousie Law School
30. For a brief description of the theoretical basis on which one might justify departure from
formal equality in the criminal justice system see my "Sentencing and Visible Minorities:
Equality and Affinmative Action in the Criminal Justice System,"supra, note 26, pp. 403-408.
31. For the Law Reform Commission's early views on this topic, see its Working Paper, No.
7, Diversion, Ottawa, 1975.
32. See for example, M. Wright and B. Galaway, eds. Mediation and Criminal Justice,
(London: Sage, 1989); Gene Stephens, "Participatory Justice: The Politics of the Future"
(1986),3 Justice Quarterly 67; or C.B. Harrington and S. Engle Merry, "Ideological Production:
The Making of Community Mediation" (1989), 22 Law and Society Review 709.
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Gerald N. Rosenberg,' The HollowiHope: Can CourtsBringAboutSocial
Change? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). ISBN
0-226-72702-5. 357 pp.
Coming as it does in the midst of all the palaver over political correctness
within the American academic community, The Hollow Hope is, if
nothing else, an opportune articulation of iconoclasm in the debate over
civil rights and constitutional law in the United States.' Professor
Rosenberg's questioning of the "cult of the court" provides a welcome
expression of healthy skepticism towards an institution which conventional
myth reveres beyond its due.
Though it is a study of the U.S. courts, and is clearly written for an
American audience, Professor Rosenberg's study also provides a useful
point of contemplation for Canadians as we stand at the tenth anniversary
of our own constitutionally enshrined bill of rights. Reading the book, one
cannot help but ask whether we, too, may have misplaced our faith in the
Constitution and the Supreme Court as a remedy for all the evils in
Canadian society.
As Professor Rosenberg writes in the Preface, The Hollow Hope "is a
book about the role of the courts in producing major political and
sociological change in the middle and late decades of the twentieth
century" .3 He captures the essence of the temperament with which his
inquiry is concerned by opening with the following exchange between
Justice Robert Jackson of the Supreme Court of the United States and
U.S. Attorney General J. Lee Rankin during the hearing of Briggs v.
Elliott:
JUSTICE JACKSON: "I suppose that realistically the reason this case is
here was that action couldn't be obtained from Congress. Certainly it
would be much stronger from your point of view if Congress did act,
wouldn't it?"
MR. RANKIN: "That is true, but ... if the Court would delegate back to
Congress from time to time the question of deciding what should be done
about rights ... the parties [before the Court] would be deprived by that
procedure from getting their constitutional rights because of the present
membership or approach of Congress to that particular question." 4
1. Gerald N. Rosenberg, MA (Oxon.), JD (Michigan), PhD (Yale). Assistant Professor of
Political Science and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. Hereafter cited as Rosenberg.
2. An articulation which one suspects could come from few places other than the University
of Chicago!
3. Rosenberg, p. xi.
4. Rosenberg, p. 1.
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While the Attorney General's response may have been refreshingly
frank (and, to the ears of a Canadian lawyer, not a little startling!),
Rosenberg points out that both the question and the answer presuppose
that the courts do have the ability to effect societal change. It is this
expression of mutual faith that he sets out to explore. He says that it raises
at least three questions which are worthy of further investigation:
- To what extent, and under what conditions can the judicial process be
used to produce political and social change?
- What are the constraints that operate on the courts in their work?
- What factors are important in determining whether the courts can play
an effective role in societal change?
In his analysis, Rosenberg looks at five broad areas of the law in which
conventional wisdom holds that Supreme Court opinions have been the
precursors of dramatic change in the years since the Second World War:
civil rights, women's rights (including the right to abortion), environmental
law, legislative reapportionment and criminal law.
He begins his examination by describing the two competing visions of
the judicial branch: the "constrained court" v. the "dynamic court". The
latter, he writes, views the courts as a functional institution. It sees the
American judiciary as the leader of "the world's most powerful court
system, protecting minorities and defending liberty in the face of opposition
from the democratically elected branches".5
Rosenberg asserts that the key to the dynamic court view is the belief
that courts are free from electoral constraints (p. 22).6 Insulated from the
more base aspects of the political world, they are able to act in the face of
public opposition, where elected officials might be fearful of political
repercussions. This is most clearly the case, the theory goes, in cases of
social reform, when entrenched interests would otherwise have sufficient
political power to thwart legislative change.
Against this is juxtaposed the image of the courts, although not
susceptible to direct political coercion, as being constrained by their
institutional limitations. According to this view, since courts lack both
budgetary and "physical" (i.e. policing) powers, they "can do little more
than point out how actions have fallen short of constitutional or legislative
requirements and hope that appropriate action is taken". 7 It was for this
reason that in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton described the
5. Rosenberg, p. 2.
6. While this may be true forthe Supreme Court and the Federal Courts, it is worthwhile to note
that in over40 states, at least aportion of the superiorbench is eitherelected orsubject to recall.
7. Rosenberg, p. 3.
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courts as the "least dangerous" branch of government. Accordingly, even
if the courts do strike out in a bold and innovative direction, they rely upon
the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches for enforcement.
In writing about the repeated frustrations encountered by the courts
during the school desegregation process, for instance, he stirringly
describes the Federal southern judiciary as "fifty-eight lonely men." 8
The constrained court view also emphasizes that in the American
context,9 judges are not truly beyond the reach of politics since they are
selected by the executive. Anyone in doubt of the truth of this statement
this need only look at the pitiful charade that has surrounded the recent
Supreme Court confirmation hearings for its verification.'"
It is clear that of the two models, Rosenberg thinks that the constrained
court view is the more accurate. In his estimation, there are three separate
and powerful limitations operating against the ability of the courts to play
a leading role in social evolution: the limited nature of constitutional
rights (and thus, the inherent restrictions on the courts' freedom of
manoeuver), the lack of judicial independence and thejudiciary's lack of
powers of implementation.
Rosenberg first tests his theory by asking whether a cause-and-effect
relationship existed between the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education" and the advances made by the civil rights
movement in the 1950s and 1960s.
Brown has been the rallying cry for civil rights activists in the United
States for over 35 years, 2 and on its face, it was the first in an impressive
line of noble and proud decisions culminating in the eradication of
segregation from all publicly funded facilities. Despite this, Rosenberg
argues that in substantive terms, real progress was not made in the area
of civil rights until the legislative and executive branches entered the
field.
The statistics that Rosenberg provides to support his assertions are
astounding. He notes, for example, that ten years after Brown, only 1.2%
8.1bid., p. 91.
9. And, one hastens to add, in the context of Canada and most of the Commonwealth, too.
10. Though lest it be thought that this is a phenomenon of the Reagan/Bush Presidencies, one
has only to look back to the Roosevelt "Court-packing" crisis of 1937 to see how long-standing
the practice of direct attempts by the executive to influence the judiciary really is.
11.347 U.S. 483 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (the latter being thejudgement as to remedy).
12. And as an aside, while I could not prove this in any way, my own experiences in an
American law school leave me with the distinct impression that Brown seems to be the case that
is still most talked about by American law students, Roe v. Wade notwithstanding.
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of black children in the South attended school with whites.' 3 Excluding
Texas and Tennessee, the two states with the lowest percentage of black
school enrollment, the figure drops to less than one half of one per cent
(.48%)! In contrast, he notes that in the first year after the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, nearly as much desegregation was achieved as in
all the preceding years since Brown. And as a testament to the depth of
the intransigence of the pro-segregation forces, Rosenberg recalls that in
1979, i.e. twentyfive years after the decision, Linda Brown, the original
plaintiff, had to file a desegregation suit on behalf of her children against
the very same school board. 4
Rosenberg suggests that contrary to popular belief, the real effect of
Brown was to so anger the pro-segregation forces that some civil rights
legislation which might otherwise have passed died as a result. 11 He goes
on to note that segregation legislation actually increasedin the years after
1954.16
Rosenberg asserts that it was not until the passage of the Civil Rights
Actof 1964 that the constraints limiting court effectiveness were overcome
and the courts could "re-enter the field with vigour". 17 And not surprisingly,
he attributes the passage of the legislation to economic and resulting
political dictates rather than litigation." In Chapter 5, Rosenberg traces
the evolution of this pressure, including the demands placed on the United
States by the world community as a result of her position as the leader of
the "free world". He points to such things as the 1959 Annual Report of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights which argued that voting
discrimination "undermines the moral suasion of our national stand in
international affairs", 19 as well as a request to the freedom riders by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy that they halt their journey so that it
could allow President John F Kennedy to hold talks with European and
Communist heads of state "without the vivid reminder of segregation", 20
as evidence of the particular sensitivity of the Federal Government to the
issue.
13. Rosenberg, p. 52.
14.Ibid., p. 40, n. 2.
15. Ibid., p. 155.
16. Ibid., pp. 78-82.
17.Ibid., p. 75.
18. At pp. 160 - 162, Rosenberg looks at the shifts in electoral patterns and the consequent
changes in electioneering. He notes with some amusement that in the 1956 campaign, the
Republican Party tried to paint itself as the civil rights party by producing a pamphlet entitled
"Abe and Ike - In Deed Alike".
19. Ibid., p. 164.
20. Ibid., p. 165.
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Rosenberg suggests that the change that occurred with the CivilRights
Act was in large measure a function of the fact that Title VI of the Act
prohibited the payment of federal transfer funds to errant states. 2'
Moreover, he notes that southern business leaders began to "perceive,
dimly at first, that their racism and abdication of leadership were taking
a heavy toll; they were losing to other cities the industry they might have
had" .22 Whatever the case, the results seem dramatic: by the 1972 school
year, for example, 83% of Louisiana's black students went to school with
whites, as compared with only 1.1% in 1965. Similarly, in Jackson,
Mississippi, where federal funding doubled between 1968 - 69 and 1969
- 70, in the same period the integrated school population jumped from
5.4% to 98.6%!
"Fine", one wants to say, "the Court's decision may have had little
direct effect on the ending of segregation, but surely Brown played a role
in paving the way for the civil rights legislation of the 1950s and 60s".
Rosenberg contends that an examination of the legislative record shows
this not to have been the case. He argues that Brown and its sister
decisions played very little part in the creation of congressional and
executive support for civil rights. Quite to the contrary, he asserts that
support amongst the power base for civil rights was based on the belief
that unless Congress and the President did act, mass bloodshed would
occur. He states that "avoidance of violence was the lynchpin of the
Kennedy administration's civil rights program." 23
Rosenberg sums up his observations about the Supreme Court's role
in the civil rights movement by concluding that "[t]he combination of all
these factors - growing civil rights pressure from the 1930s, economic
changes, the Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, the increase
in mass communication - created the pressure that led to civil rights. The
Court reflected that pressure; it did not create it."24
Rosenberg next turns his attention to the women's movement and the
development of pro-choice rights.25 Court action alone, he believes, could
not have overcome the deeply-embedded societal prejudice against the
notion of gender equality. Rather, in Rosenberg's opinion, progress by
the women's movement is largely attributable to the impetus provided by
economic dictates which first crystallized during the Second World War
21. Ibid., p. 100.
22. Ibid., p. 101.
23. Ibid., p. 123.
24. Ibid., p. 169.
25. Ibid., pp. 173 - 265.
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(and which, he notes, was prior to the Supreme Court entering the field)
as well as the political activism of the women's movement. Reaching a
conclusion similar to that concerning advances in civil rights, he writes:
"... Court opinions were delivered into a political, economic, and social
system in which powerful forces were pushing for change. Court decisions
joined a current of social change and a tide of history; they did not create
it". 26
As has been mentioned, the book contains comparable examinations
of the developments in the environmental movement, reapportionment
and the criminal law. In each, Rosenberg arrives at more-or-less parallel
observations that in the absence of broad-based political and/or economic
support for change, the courts acting alone have been ineffectual in
bringing about real social transformation.
Anyone familiar with Professor Patrick Monahan's work will already
haveheardthis contention. Inhis 1987 book, Politics andthe Constitution:
The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada,7 for
example, Monahan noted that one of the chief arguments against the
entrenchment of rights and the consequent empowerment of the courts
was that historically, whenever the rights of the disadvantaged in Canadian
society have been advanced, it has been accomplished through the
political process. "Social programs", he described the argument, "and the
institutions of the welfare state, whatever their shortcomings, are the
progeny of the triumph of politics over economics and the market."28
These critics of the Charter, he noted, regarded the state as a source of
social justice, rather than oppression and domination. Related to this is
the corollary that whenever the political process has acted to improve the
lot of the disadvantaged, it has done so in spite of the courts, not in concert
with them.29
Possibly because in addition to his legal education, Professor Rosenberg
was trained as a political scientist, The Hollow Hope is profusely
illustrated with graphs and charts. Indeed (though this may be nothing
more than a reflection of the fact that I was not similarly trained), at times
I felt close to being overwhelmed by the statistics and references that he
marshalls in support of his thesis. The book is unquestionably a
treasure-trove for anyone carrying out research into-the development of
post-War American society.
26. Ibid., p. 265.
27. Toronto: Carswell, 1987.
28. Ibid., p. 43.
29. It is significant to consider, for example, that the Canadian labourmovement has not wholly
embraced the Charter and its judicial treatment as a good thing for the working people of
Canada.
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Having said this, one feels a certain temptation to take Professor
Rosenberg to task for restricting his enquiry to such large and deeply-rooted
problems as racial prejudice and gender inequality. His conclusions
might have been somewhat different had he looked at smaller, more
discrete issues within the larger framework. I am thinking, for example,
of the decision of our Supreme Court in Murdoch v. Murdoch.30 Restricted
as the case was to a legal issue, and though he was speaking in dissent, it
is nonetheless arguable that Mr. Justice Laskin's (as he then was) reasons
for urging that a woman's contribution of money and labour to her
husband's property be legally recognized played a pivotal role in forcing
provincial legislatures to act at a time when they might have preferred to
do otherwise."a
In addition, one cannot help but feel that it is a shame that Professor
Rosenberg did notputgreater effort into making his work more accessible
to the generalist. As it is, the book would be very tough slogging for
anyone but the most dedicated reader. One does not want to be too critical
of such a meticulous and thorough work of research scholarship, but the
dryness of the text seems a bit sad when one considers that the subject
matter is so topical that it could have made for a very good read.
The differences between Canadian and American society, and between
the Canadian Charter and the U.S. Bill of Rights, are of course
well-documented. Chief among these -at least in the context of Professor
Rosenberg's thesis - is the greater premium that we in Canada place upon
collective rights and peace, order and good government. The deference
to authority that is supposed to be so much a part of our psyche
undoubtedly strengthens the position of the courts in Canada compared
with those south of the border.32 Moreover, much of the euphoria that
30. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
31. The decision of the House of Lords concerning negligent misrepresentation in Hedley,
Byrne & Co v. Heller, [1964] A.C. 465, also comes to mind. Insofar as alteration of business
practices can be called "social change", there is no doubt that after theirLordships' admonition,
the way that prudent businessmen and women conducted themselves changed dramatically.
,32. Although after the results of our recent constitutional referendum, perhaps this bit of
conventional wisdom also needs to be rethought.
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accompanied the adoption of the Charter3 3 has now been replaced by a
certain amount of realism (or perhaps resignation).
Nevertheless, The Hollow Hope is a compelling study for the Canadian
legal scholar. It is submitted that in this year of anniversary, it can help
us focus on the limitations in our new constitutional arrangements - to
borrow the words of Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court, to help us
realize that despite our adoption of a statement of fundamental rights, the
Charter cannot be the cure for all our social ills. 4
Without meaning to denigrate the Charter and the values that it is
meant to embody, it is perhaps worthwhile to reflect upon the fact that
ultimately, Canadian society will be as good or bad as individual
Canadians want it to be. The Charter's role in society should not be
overplayed. It may be a purposive document, but as Mr. Justice Dickson
reminded us in Hunter v. Southam,35 the Charter is intended to constrain,
not mandate, government action. 6 We must remember that we are above
33. I think that possibly the best expression of this euphoria came from Jean Chrdtien. In a
speech given at the University of British Columbia in 1985, he said:
Because we have a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our Constitution, I feel very strongly
that Canada is a better place to live than it was before. We shall never again be able to
become complacent about the weak in our society. Usually it is the majority and those with
strength who rule. They take care of the weak in our society if they so wish. ... But now this
is also the role of the state through our courts, who must guarantee equality in our society
- the equality of race, of religion, of sex, of language. These wuill become one of the
measures by which the value of our society will be judged in the centuries to come. I think
that we have decided that Canada has achieved that level of sophistication. We are all the
players. With all of our aspirations, and despite our political differences, everyone made a
great contribution to what is, in my judgement, a very good Constitution and a very good
Charter of Rights. I would like to end with the words with the leader of the NDP, who said
that Canada's Charter of Rights is the best Charter of Rights in the world.
(Quoted from J. Weiler and R. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986)).
34. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Harlan J. stated (in dissent):
[Tihese decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the
constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill
in this country can find its cure in some constitutional "principle" and that this Court should
"take the lead" in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act. The
Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court,
ordained as judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The
Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in
a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise that this nation will realize
liberty for all its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise,
does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified
impatience with the slow workings of the political process.
35. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
36. Ibid., at 155.
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all apolitical democracy, and that the Charter was aimed at strengthening
the democratic process, rather than replacing it. Though it is directed at
the United States with its different constitutional tradition, The Hollow
Hope provides a timely jar to that memory.
Ian Holloway
The University of California at Berkeley
